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Several recent papers argue that corporate income taxes should not be used by small, open
economies. With capital mobility, the burden of the tax falls on fixed factors (e.g.,labor),and
the tax system is more efficient if labor is taxed directly. However, corporate taxes not only
exist but rates are roughly comparable with the top personal tax rates. Past models also forecast
that multinationals should not invest in countries with low corporate tax rates, since the surtax
they owe when profits are repatriated puts them at a competitive disadvantage. Yet such foreign
direct investment is substantial. We suggest that the resolution of these puzzles may be found
in the role of income shifting, both domestic (between the personal and corporate tax bases) and
cross-border (through transfer pricing). Countries need cash-flow corporate taxes as a backstop
to labor taxes to discourage individuals from converting their labor income into otherwise
untaxed corporate income. We explore how these taxes can best be modified to deal as well with
cross-border shifting.
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The role of the corporate income tax in distorting capital investment and savings deci-
sions has been investigated at length in the academic literature.' While muchprogress has
been made in understanding the behavioral implications of the tax, the recent literature
has increasingly raised questions regarding why such taxes continue to exist. For example,
Gordon (1986) and Razin and Sadka (1991) argued that a small open economy should not
impose a source-based tax such as a corporate income tax on capital income. If capital is
mobile and the country is a price-taker in the world capital market, then capital cannot
bear the incidence of the tax. Firms would continue to locate in the country only if other
factor prices (primarily for land and labor) drop by enough to compensate firms for the
higher amount they have to generate pretax so as to be able to provide capital-owners the
going rate of return after tax. But if these other factors bear the tax anyway, then it would
be better to tax them directly, thereby eliminating a distortion that discourages capital
investment in the country.
While the theory forecasts that small open economies should not impose source-based
taxes on capital income, in fact essentially all developed economies do impose corporate
income taxes. Not only are corporate tax rates nonzero, but in recent years they tend
to be roughly comparable with the top personal tax rate in each country. Are countries
systematically using a tax that is dominated by other available instruments? Or has
something important been omitted from the existing theories?2
SeeAuerbach (1983), forexample, for arecent survey ofthe effects of the tax on corporate investment.
2 Amore extended discussion of alternative explanations for corporate taxation, and their limitations,
can be found in Gordon (1992).
1The problem with the existing theories cannot be simply thatthey assume economies
are small and open. If economies are large, then they certainly have an incentiveto take
advantage of their market power in world capital markets. Capital importers wouldwant
to reduce their capital imports to drive down the interest ratethey pay on these imports,
so would want to tax domestic investment and encourage domestic savings.Conversely,
capital exporters would want to reduce their capital exports by taxing domesticsavings
and subsidizing domestic investment. But we do notsee opposite patterns of taxation
in capital-importing and capital-exporting countries,nor do we see sign changes when
countries change from exporting to importing capital (as the U.S. did inthe 1980's).
What if countries are not that open? Feldstein and Horioka(1980) provided striking
empirical evidence suggesting that capital is quite immobileinternationally. If economies
are relatively closed, then it might appear that pressures due tocapital mobility would
be much abated, allowing capital income taxes to survive. Butany conclusions here will
depend critically on what factors limit capital mobility. Gordon andBovenberg (1993)
explore the policy implications of various possible explanations for theobserved capital
immobility, and find little prospect for rationalizing existingcorporate taxes through this
route.
The puzzles are not confined to government behavior. Firmbehavior is also puzzling.
Existing theories forecast, for example, that multinationals based inhigh-tax rate countries
are at a distinct tax disadvantage when investing in low-tax-rate countries. As doall firms
located there, they pay corporate income taxes to thelocal government. However, they
pay ad&tional taxes to their home government when profits are repatriated. Thissurtax
should put the multinational at a taxdisadvantage. Yet U.S. multinationals invest heavily
even in the lowest-tax-rate countries; see,e.g., Hines and Rice (1990).
Reported rates of return also contradict the theoretical predictions. Domesticsurtaxes
on foreign earnings are postponed until repatriation,so multinationals face lower effective
tax rates in countries with lower statutory rates. Thisimplies that the pre-tax competitive
rate of return should be lower in low-tax countries. ButHines and Hubbard (1990) and
Grubert and Mutti (1987) find thatpre-tax profit rates are higher in low—tax countries.
Observed investment and profit rates in low-tax countriesare almost certainly explained
2by the ease with which a multinational can shift its accounting profits from high-tax to low-
tax jurisdictions. For example, a subsidiary in a high-tax country can charge artificially
low prices for outputs and pay artificially high prices for inputs that it exchanges with a
subsidiary in a low-tax country. This lowers higher-taxed income and raises lower-taxed
income, reducing the firm's global tax liabilities. Locating subsidiaries in tax havens
facilitates this process, and it is not surprising that these subsidiaries as a result report
a high pre-tax rate of return. Confirming evidence of the prevalence of income-shifting
is provided by Harris etal.(1993). They find that firms with subsidiaries in low-tax
countries pay lower U.S. taxes, and firms with subsidiaries in high-tax countriespay higher
U.S. taxes, suggesting income shifting from high to low tax locations.
Cross-border income shifting alone cannot explain the puzzling aspects of government
behavior, however. If we take account of not only the mobility of real capital but also
the mobility of accounting profits, the pressures to reduce corporate tax rates are only
increased. The forecast is still that corporate tax rates should equal zero.
Transfer pricing is not, however, the only important type of income shifting that is
likely to occur. Musgrave (1959), for example, argued that a primary role for the corporate
income tax is to close off opportunities for individuals to shift labor income to an otherwise
untaxed corporate tax base. Without a corporate tax, for example, owner/managers of
closely held firms could incorporate, retain earnings rather than pay them out as wages,
then sell some of their shares, making their earnings subject to capital gains tax rates
rather than labor income tax rates. A corporate tax would offset this tax incentive, and
reduce the efficiency costs that such income shifting might induce.
In this paper, we model explicitly the effects of both forms of income shifting on be-
havior and on optimal tax policy. In section 1, we introduce only domestic income shifting
(between personal and corporate income) and explore its effects on optimal tax design. We
find that optimal source-based taxation on corporations is positive, with a tax rate equal
to the labor income tax rate. The optimal tax is a pure profits or cash-flow tax.
In section 2, we add cross-border income shifting (transfer pricing) to the model. In
response to transfer pricing, countries face incentives to tax elements of reported income
that are most subject to transfer pricing at a reduced rate, or make them only partially
3deductible. The optimal corporate tax rate is now somewhat less than the rateon labor,
which is consistent with most tax systems in developed countries (at least for thetop tax
rates on labor, which presumably apply to those people best able to shift income to the
corporate sector).
We explore a variety of other seemingly puzzling aspects of existingcorporate tax codes
in section 3. Why, for example, do many countries allow multinationals to receive credits
rather than deductions for taxes they paid abroad? Why are they taxedonly when profits
are repatriated? Why do host countries tax the income of foreign subsidiaries? Weargue
that these aspects of the law also make sense if the primarypressure affecting the design
of the law is the need to prevent income shifting.
1. Tax Policy With Domestic Income Shifting
We first explore two approaches to modeling tax policy in the face of domesticincome
shifting. In the first, the model we will ultimately use for the host countries, individuals
can shift the form of payment of their labor income from cashwages to nonwage forms,
taxed in practice at the corporate tax rate. For example,a closely held firm in which the
shares are owned by the manager and employeescan retain what would otherwise have been
wage payments, generating capital gains for the shareholder/employees.3 Eliminatingwage
deductions generates income subject to corporatetaxes, while we assume for simplicity
that the capital gains received by employeeson their shares are free of personal taxes.4
Such income shifting presumably imposes real costson the firm, however, since these
alternative forms of compensation affect employees'liquidity and risk bearing, and may
create complications due to asymmetric information about the value of these shares.
The second model, which we apply to homecountries, assumes that only corporate
entrepreneurs are in a position to shift their form ofpay at a reasonable cost. When
Alternatively, the firm can pay employees in the form of stock transfers or qualified stockoptions rather
than wages, generating extra taxable income for the firm dueto the lost wage deductions and normally
generating only capital gains income for the employees.
in most countries personal capital income in at leastsome forms is taxed more lightly than labor
Income. Examples include a zero tax on capital gains that are passed to heirs atdeath; a lower tax rate
on dividends; and faverable treatment of pension savings.
4individuals make a career choice between becoming an entrepreneur or an employee, and
between incorporating or not, they take into account that income earned as an employee (or
noncorporate entrepreneur) would be taxed under the personal income tax whereas income
earned as a corporate entrepreneur could in practice be taxed under the corporate tax but
exempt from personal taxes. The choices to become an entrepreneur and to incorporate
both involve a variety of nontax considerations, however, that must be traded off with any
tax factors.5
In each model, a corporate income tax can be used to reduce the tax incentives that
would otherwise exist to shift one's form of pay or one's career path. This role for the
corporate income tax was mentioned at least as far back as Musgrave (1959). To focus on
this role for the corporate tax, we will not introduce capital into the model. Our objective
is not to rationalize the existence of capital income taxes, but of corporate income taxes.
While existing corporate taxes do distort capital investment decisions, much of the revenue
seems to be collected from the taxation of pure profits, which we interpret to represent the
return to entrepreneurial ideas and effort.6 We are able to introduce a distortionary tax
that captures the essential features of a corporate income tax without modeling capital
explicitly.
1.1 Optimal tax policy in home coijrmtries
Consider first a situation in which corporate entrepreneurs but not other individuals can
shift their income from the personal to the corporate tax base. In particular, assume that
the population consists of a composite individual. This individual spends some fraction
1 —hof his work effort as an employee, earning a wage w that is taxed at the personal tax
rate t. The remaining work effort is spent running corporations. Here, the net return per
unit of effort before tax equals ir; this income is taxable at rate r leaving ir(1 —r)ir
See Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989), MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1993) and Gordon andMacKie-Mason
(1994) for more detailed analysesof thedecision whether to incorporate.
6Gordonand Slemrod (1988) and Shoven (1991) have calculated that although the U.S. corporate
income tax generates substantial revenues, capital income taxes in the U.S. in total have generated negative
revenues in recent years.
5net of tax.7 Setting up a new corporation requires an outlay of resources, however, and
we assume that there are diminishing returns to these expenditures. These start-up costs
are assumed to be deductible against the profits tax. On net, we therefore describe the
individual's net wage rate, wi,,by
=(1
—h)w(1—t)+ h(1 —r)ir — (1
—r)c(h),
where c(h) measures the cost of setting up a new corporation of sufficient size to absorb
the fraction h of one's work time. The individual's resulting utilitycan be expressed by
the indirect utility function V(w).
Individuals decide how much to work, and how to split this time betweenbeing an
employee vs. being an entrepreneur. The first-order condition for h simply implies that
w(1 —t)= (1 —r)(ir
—c'),so that the net returns from the two career paths are equalized
at the margin, after taking into account the costs of becomingan entrepreneur.
Consider the optimal tax policy in this country. The government'sobjective is to choose
the tax rates t and r, so as to maximize the objective
14' =V(w)+ AL{(i —h)tw+ hrir —
whereL represents total hours of work, and where Ameasures the marginal utility received
from extra government expenditures. Consider the effect ofincreasing r and cutting 2
simultaneously so as to leave w unaffected. To keep w,, unaffected, we need thatOt/Or =
—(hir—c(h))/[(1
—h)w].With w fixed, L also remains unchanged. Since OW/Ot =
OW/Or=0under the optimal policies, this combined tax change should leave welfare
unaffected at the margin. The resulting first-order condition for thisproposed tax change,
after some simplification, equals
OW,'Oh OhOt\
(1)
Engeneral,rincludesbothcorporate and personal taxes due on corporate income. For simplicity of
discussion, wewillrefer to r as the corporatetaxrate,asif no personal taxes are due on this income, whether it is paid out as dividends or realizedas capitalgains.Since theentrepreneurhas the option to pay all Income out as wages, the maximumeffective taxrate on corporate income ist.
6Raising corporate taxes (r) and lowering labor taxes (t) lead to an unambiguous decrease
in h, lowering the time spent as an entrepreneur and increasing time spent as an employee.
Therefore, this first order condition implies that OW/Oh = 0, implying that r(ir —c')=tw
under the optimal tax policy —thesame taxes are paid regardless of career choice, so as
not to distort the individual's choice of h. Substituting for r —c'from the individual's
first-order condition, we find that r = t under the optimal policy.
In addition, we can show that the government would not want to introduce a distorting
tax on corporate activity. Consider, for example, some distorting tax o on the firm, leaving
it with net profits (1 —'r)[ir
—S(c,X)],where X represents the real decisions made by the
firm which are distorted by c. The government's policy objective would now equal
W =V(w)+AL{(1 —h)tw+ h(rir + (1 —r)S)
—rc(h)}.
In order to show that the optimal value of c7 is zero, consider the effects of raising o
and simultaneously lowering r so as to leave w, and thus L unchanged. This requires that
Or/Oa =—[(1—r)h/(h(ir
—S)—c)]OS/Ocr.The resulting first-order condition for W is8
OW (Oh OhOr\/Oir OS\ OX
(2)
By equation (1), OW/Oh =0under the optimal tax policy, so that the first term in equation
(2) is zero. Since the firm's first—order condition for X implies that Oir/OX =OS/OX,
equation (2) implies that OS/OX = 0 under the optimal policy. Since by assumption
distorts the firm's choice of X, OS/OX can equal zero only when u =0.The optimal tax
policy therefore consists of a wage tax plus a non-distortionary cash-flow corporate tax at
equal rates.
1.2 Optimal tax policy in host countries
Consider next a slightly different model, in which all employees are in a position to shift
the tax treatment of their labor income. In particular, assume that there is only one source
of employment, working to produce some good X. This good is produced using a constant
8 Since apure profits tax rate is non-distorting,changing r cannot change the firm's choke ofX.
7returns technology subject to free entry, so that there are no pure profits in equilibrium.
Normally, we would assume that all earnings are paid out as wages, taxed at the personal
rate t. Now add the complication that if the tax rate on a firm's income, denoted byr,
is lower than that on labor income, then the firm can pay individuals in a form that is
taxed at the firm's rate rather than at the individual's rate. This income shifting is not
costless, however. If the individual receives the fraction s of her labor income w in a form
taxable at the firm's tax rate, we assume that the labor costs to the firm equalw(1+b(s)).
Here, b(s) represents the real costs of shifting the tax treatment of labor income, where by
assumption b(s) is convex, b' > 0, and b(0) =0.In equilibrium, firms continue to break
even, so that p =w*(l+ b).
The net wage rate, w,, of the representative individual therefore equals
=w[(l
—s)(1—t*)+ s(1 —
Theindividual chooses s so as to maximize her after-taxwage, holding fixed the wage costs
of the firms, giving as a first-order condition for s:
1/
1 +b (1 —t)+s(t _r) (3)
It is straightforward to show that s is increasing in t —r.This individual's utility equals
V(wJ. Denote the individual's labor supply by L.
Consider next the optimal policy of a host—countrygovernment. The objective function
of this government is
W =V'(w)+ .\*L*[r*p —y*w*(1+ b(s)) + tw(1 —s)+ r*sw*J,
where againrepresents the marginal utility received from extra government expendi-
tures. What happens if the government raises r andsimultaneously lowers t by an
amount chosen so as to leave w and therefore L' unchanged? Notethat, given the lack
of pure profits, changes in rt leave firms unaffectedas well. However, these changes make
income shifting less attractive, so s falls, causing w to rise. Theresulting change in social
welfare equals
I r'—t 1(Os9t 5
[(1 —t)+ s(t —r*)j +55$=0.
8Given that this policy change leads to a drop in income shifting, the term in brackets
should equal zero, implying that r'= t.Again, the optimal taxsystemconsists of a wage
tax plus a cash-flow corporate tax at equal rates.
An alternative to this wage tax, combined with a cash-flow tax on firms to prevent
income shifting, would have been simply to tax output of firms at some rate o'.Givenour
assumptions, raising c is equivalent to raising randi simultaneously—both simply tax
labor income and distort only the labor supply decision. This is simply the equivalence of
a uniform value-added tax and a labor income tax.
2. Tax Policy With Cross-Border Income Shifting
With domestic income shifting alone, we find that countries face an incentive to supplement
a labor income tax with a cash-flow tax on corporate income at the same rate. How does
this optimal tax structure change if we now take into account that each economy is open,
that multinationals can set up subsidiaries abroad, and that transfer pricing allows these
firms to shift accounting income easily between the parent firm and the subsidiary? Many
types of situations could be examined. We focus on the effects of possible transfer pricing
between the parent firm and its subsidiaries, and ignore other forms of mobility across
borders.
To capture these ideas formally, we develop a model with two types of countries, home
countries and host countries. We allow for multiple countries of each type, and assume
that each is a price taker in international markets. We will examine policies for some
representative home country j or representative host country i.
Multinationals are based in countries of type j, and use an imported good X to produce
a good Q. If the representative individual in a country j allocates time h to producing
we assume that the resulting output equals hf(X) —c(h),produced using inputs hX,
where 1(0) =0,f' > 0 and f" < O. The firm takes as given the price for Q in the
output market, and this price is the numeraire. The input X can be purchased on the
international market at price p, or alternatively the firm can acquire a subsidiary in some
The rest of his time is still spent as an employee earning a wage wtaxable at rate i.
9country i, produce X there, then sell this good to the parent firm for some accounting
price p. We assume that the same accounting price, p, must be used for tax purposes in
the host country.
In any country i, X can be produced by either domestic firms or foreign subsidiaries.
Labor is the only input used to produce X, and the production function is simply X =L.
For simplicity, we assume that multinationals have no technological advantage in producing
X —theonly reason for a multinational to open up a foreign subsidiary is to take advantage
of transfer pricing. The going net—of—tax wage rate is w. As described above, the firm
can either pay workers cash wages or at a cost pay them in a form taxed at the corporate
rate rather than the personal rate. If the fraction s of labor income is paid in a form taxed
at the corporate rate, then the pretax wage rate faced by the firm equals w5(1 + b(s)),
where w' adjusts so as to leave workers with the going net—of—tax wage, w.
Each country is assumed to tax pure profits, with a rate r in country janda rate r
in country i. In addition, we assume that country j(countryi) imposes a surtax on sales
revenue at rate a (as).Surtaxpayments are assumed to be deductible under the pure
profits part of the tax. For example, a firm in country jbuyinginputs on the open market
would pay in taxes [r(1 —a)+ cr]f(X) —rpX.'°'
Forconvenience of notation, we let T =r(1
—a)+ a represent the effective tax rate on
gross sales revenue for operations in country j,sothat a firm in countryj pays Tf(X)—rpX
in taxes. We define T analogously.
Consider the incentive faced by firms in country jtoacquire subsidiaries in country i.
If a multinational acquires a subsidiary in country i, then it mustpay taxes to the host
country on its operations there, and it may also owe some surtax to home country jon
the income generated in i.12 Denote the resulting effectivegross tax rate on subsidiary
W
We capture the difference in existing corporate taxes fromapure profits tax by this surtax on output.
For example, if X represents capital equipment, then this rate difference can capture the fact that revenues
are taxable immediately, whereas the amount spent buying capital is deductible only gradually over time.
If instead X represents materials, then inventory accounting rules can also lead to a postponed deduction.
In country j, the entrepreneur's startup costs are also deductible at the corporate tax rate, so total
corporate taxes are reduced by rc(h). However, this deduction affects only the individual's time allocation,
not the firm's optimal choices of p and X, and so we suppress this tax term when studying firm behavior.
12 Many countriesincluding the U.S. tax foreign-source income when it is repatriated, with a credit given
10revenues by Tr. Due to the home country surtax, T,. ￿ T, but because the tax is deferred
until the income is repatriated, T,.T.'3 Similarly, denote the effective tax rate on
subsidiary wage deductions by Tr,wherer ￿ r,.r. Given 7',. and Tr,wedefine a,.
implicitly by the relation (1 —Tr)(1—a,.)= (1 —Tr).In order to parameterize the degree
to which surtaxes are due on foreign-source income, we assume that T,. = pT + (1 —p)T*
and that r,-= pr +(1_p)r* for some p, where O<p< 1.14
We focus on tax systems that give multinationals an incentive to shift profits out of the
home country. With a subsidiary that provides an input, profits can be shifted by paying
a higher price for the input. The increased factor cost in the home country is deducted at
rate r, while the increased revenue for the subsidiary is taxed at an effective rate of T,..
Therefore, to make transfer pricing attractive, we assume for purposes of discussion that
T>T,..
If the firm can set its own factor transfer price by choosing some arbitrary accounting
price p for the input X, and if r > 7',., then we would forecast without other additions
to the model that all taxable profits would be shifted to the subsidiary. That rarely seems
to be the case.15 To rationalize this, we assume that the tax authorities expend resources
trying to prevent use of transfer pricing, and the threat of being caught and fined limits a
firm's use of transfer pricing.'6
for foreign taxes pa.id on this income. Firms may or may not have sufficient foreign tax creditstoeliminate
allhome country tax onthe subsidiary'sincome.
13 Deferralis a gain onlytothe extent towhichfunds kept abroad can be invested there earningahigher
after-local-tax rate of return than the individual's after-home-tax discount rate. If there were no taxation
of capital income and full capital mobility, then T,.=Tinspite of deferral.
14Ifthe firm repatriates profits every year, and does not have excess credits, then p = 1; if the firm
systematically has excess credits, then p = 0. In general, the value of p depends on the length of time
repatriation is deferred, the gain from deferral given the rate of return abroad relative to the discount rate,
and the likelihood that the firm has excess credits. It is worth noting that Or, which is defined implicitly
by (1 — Or) = (1 — Tr)/(1—rr), does not satisfy 0r = p + (1 —
US firms taking advantage of the "possessions tax credit" by manufacturing in Puerto Rico apparently
come close to total income shifting; see Grubert and Slemrod (1993).
In an earlier version of this paper we also constructed a model in which the accounting price, p, is
used by the parent firm's manager in deciding how much X to purchase, creating an inefficiency since
the transfer price is artificially high. Such inefficiencies might arise within a firm due to principal-agent
problems, or due to the high transactions costs of keeping one set of books for tax reporting and another
set for management operations. (Transfer price accounting is at a much finer level of detail and complexity
11In particular, in order to limit use of transfer pricing, the government is assumed to
expend resources trying to detect use of transfer pricing. Due to these enforcement efforts,
the government would have some probability 9 of documenting the use of transfer prices,
where 9 should be an increasing function of p'. If the firm is caught using transfer prices,
then it would need to pay in additional taxes an amount r(p' —p)FX on domestic earnings,
where F reflects any fines that are imposed (and perhaps any systematic deviation of
the corrected price from p). If the corrected price is then used in assessing the tax at
repatriation on foreign-source income, then the firm also receives back an amount pT(p' —
p)FXon the taxes paid on repatriated foreign earnings if caught using transfer pricing,17
implying an expected net penalty of (r—pT)(p —p)FX9. We explore the concrete example
where 9 = — p)/p]fl,with 3> 0, and for simplicity assume risk neutrality.
2.1 Behavior of MultinationaL9 With Cr083-Border Shifting
For any given h, a multinational chooses X and p to maximize its net profits of
=(l_T)f(X)_(1_T)PX+(1_Tr)PX_(1_Tr)w(1+b)X_(r_pT)(p*—p)FXO. (4)
Given this objective function, the first-order condition for p can easily be solved to show
that
F(TTr \1/fl P
The optimal value of p' is decreasing in the severity of enforcement, as measured here by
aF.'8 In addition, p is increasing inr, but decreasing in T and T. Increasing r raises
the value of deducting a high imput cost, p. Increasing T5 or T (and thus Tr) reduces
the value of reporting a high foreign unitrevenue, p5. Also, p' > p as long as r > Tr.
than the separate tax and financial reporting income statements and balance sheets that firms inmany
countr,es are required to maintain.) The results of this model were qualitatively similar to the results we
present so we do not report the details here.
17 Weassume here that the fine is assessed on the net change in overall tax liability, and that foreign tax
payments are unaffected by these recalculations of domestic tax liabilities.
18 Ingeneral, the direction of effect of /3 on p is ambiguous.
12It will prove convenient to note that at this optimal value of p, the value of F9 equals'9
FO-TTr —
(a+1)(r-pTy
If we substitute this expression for FO into the profit measure, we find that net profits
equal2°
= (1— T)f(X) —(1 —r)pX +1(T_Tr)(p* —p)X —p(l —rr)(c—')pX.
Here, the first two terms measure what profits would have been, had the firm simply
purchased X on the open market. The third term measures the net gain from use of
transfer pricing, after taking into account the effects of tax enforcement —taxenforcement
not only lowers pS but also recaptures the fraction 1/(1+j3) of the tax savings from transfer
pricing. This term in itself raises profits. The last term reflects the fact that, without use
of transfer pricing, the subsidiary operates at a competitive disadvantage because of the
surtaxes due when profits are repatriated.
The first-order condition for X can be written, after substituting for the value of FO,
(1—T)f' =(l—r)p— p1(rTr)(P _p)+p(l_rr)(_c*)p. (5)
Here, the left-hand side equals the value of the extra output whereas the right-hand side
equals the net-of-tax cost of the extra input. Only the first term on the right-hand side
appears if the firm does not set up a subsidiary. Since the second term on the right-hand
side is negative whereas the third term is positive, it would appear that the change in X
due to use of transfer pricing is ambiguous. However, we show next that X must increase
whenever the subsidiary is worth acquiring.
When is the subsidiary worth acquiring? The answer depends on the extent of en-
forcement in the home country. Comparing profits with or without the subsidiary, and
Notethat theequilibrium probability of being caught is independent of a and a decreasing function
of 9.
20Insimplifying this expression, we have assumed that competitive firms survive in the host country, so
that (1—cr)p=w(1+b).
13simplifying using a second-order approximation to output around the output level without
the subsidiary, the change in profits from opening the subsidiary equals
.5(1 — — )2+Xa 1(r —Tr)(p_p) —p(l
— — (6)
where X3 is the chosen output level with the subsidiary, and X is the chosen output level
without it. For the subsidiary to be worth opening, the sum of the terms inside the brackets
must be positive, since the first term is necessarily negative. Equation (5) then implies that
X3 > X. Therefore, a necessary but not sufficient condition for the subsidiary to be worth
opening is that desired output increase with the subsidiary. As tax enforcement (measured
by aF) increases, the first term inside the brackets becomes smaller, due to the fall in p,
and is eventually dominated by the second term.21 Therefore, subsidiaries and transfer
pricing would no longer be attractive if there is sufficient tax enforcement. Similarly, as
p rises, increasing the importance of the surtax at repatriation, then T,. increases and p5
falls. Both these changes cause the first term inside the brackets to fall. In addition, the
rise in p causes the second term to become more negative, again making the subsidiary
less attractive.
If X is produced in various countries, each with its own tax structure, where will the
multinational prefer to invest? Assume that w' has been set so that competitive firms
break even in all countries where X is produced, implying that p(l —cr)= w(1 + b). To
judge the locational preferences of a multinational we examine how the firm's aggregate
profits, as measured in equation (4), change as we vary the tax rates faced in country i.
The derivative of the firm's profits with respect to r5,takinginto account the forecast
that wages will not vary, equals —(1 —p)X[(l
—u5)p'
—w(1+ b)1. Since this expression
equals zero when p = p, it is necessarily negative given that p1 > p, yielding the expected
conclusion that multinationals prefer to invest in countries with lower r'.22 Put differently,
they would be willing to pay somewhat higher wage rates in countries with lower r5,
potentially leading to production where real resource costs are not minimized.
21 Ingeneral,however,increasing /3 hasambiguous effectson the net gain fromtransfer pricing.
22
As expected, introducing transfer pricing enables us to rationalize the substantial activity by multi-
nationals in tax havens.
14Similarly, if we differentiate equation (4) with respect to c, taking into account the
forecasted change in w', we get
X[(1 —rr)P — (1 — p)(l — r')pJ. (7)
Thefirst term in this equation reflects the fact that countries with a higher o have lower
wage rates, making them more attractive locations, everything else equal. However, the
higher o- also means higher local tax payments, which are only partly offset by the credit
received against home country taxes when profits are repatriated. If repatriation of profits
can be deferred for a long time, so that p0, then the second term dominates and the
firm would prefer to invest in countries with a low value of .Butthis is not generally
true.
2.2 Optimal tax policy in the host country
Consider next the optimal tax policy in the host country, now allowing for the possible set-
up of subsidiaries and the resulting use of transfer pricing. The objective of the government
now equals
W' =V(w,)+ AtL[Tp —'rw(1+ b(s)) + tw(l —s)+ rsw].
In analyzing this case, we assume that multinationals own all production facilities, and that
the wage is set so that they are indifferent to locating in this country rather than in some
other country. If the country is small, then at the margin the domestic wage must adjust
in response to any given tax change so as to leave net profits of multinationals unaffected.
(If the wage falls far enough, domestic ownership will replace foreign ownership.)
Consider then what happens if the government raiseswhile simultaneously lowering
so as to leave profits of multinationals unaffected at the existing wage rate. Under these
simultaneous tax changes, T* falls to compensate for the fall in the rate that applies to tax
deductions, leading to a rise in p'. In addition, assume that the government simultaneously
raises t to compensate for the fall in r' so as to leave w, and therefore L unaffected.
These tax changes cause s to rise, leading to a compensating fall in w so as to leave
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We conclude from equation (8) that sign(T') =sign(i'
—r').Given the need for govern-
ment revenue, the sign of each must be positive, implying that T' > 0 and t' > r'. Not
only is there a positive corporate tax, but in general this tax will be distorting—there is
nothing in equation (8) causing T' to equal r'.
Simply taxing labor income directly leads to efficiency losses due to income shifting,
whereas the alternative of taxing output creates an efficiency loss by making the country
a less attractive location for multinationals. These two sources of efficiency loss are traded
off under the optimal tax system.
Note that if domestic income shifting is not a problem so that 3isnot responsive to
tax policy, then the right-hand side of equation (8) equals zero. We then infer that T' =0
under the optimal policy, making the country a very attractive location for multinationals,
in effect a tax haven. Given the lack of domestic income shifting, taxes are simply collected
on labor income. If all labor income is paid out as wages, this can be done either through
a personal tax on labor income, a payroll tax at the firm level, or a refundable V.A.T.23
If, instead, domestic income shifting is responsive enough to tax policy, so that the
optimal value of T' is high, then multinationals would be outbid for workers by domestic
firms. But with only domestic operations surviving, output prices would no longer be
responsive to tax policy, implying as in the original model that the tax system simply con-
sists of a tax on labor income, taking the form either of a personalwage tax supplemented
by a cash-flow corporate tax at an equal rate, or instead a value-added tax.
In general, there are two local optimum for tax policy. One has a low T' satisfying
equation (8), leading foreign multinationals to set up local subsidiaries. The second has
a high T', no activity by multinationals, but no domestic income shifting. Which local
optima dominates would depend on the country's circumstances. In choosing between
23Note that if the V.A.T.isnot refundable, and adjustment occurs instead through changes in the
exchange rate, then the tax still distorts the transfer pricing decisions of foreign subsidiaries.
16the two local optima, a country would make a conscious decision whether or not to be a
tax haven and thereby attract foreign multinationals at the expense of undermining its
domestic tax system.
One other result worth noting is that the host country does not attempt to take ad-
vantage of the credits offered to multinationals when they repatriate profits —asseen
in equation (8), the size of any credit, which is captured by p, does not affect the host
country's optimal tax policy. This result holds as long as p <1,and stands in contrast to
the results in Gordon (1992), derived assuming p =1.Even though the net cost of a host
country tax may be small to a multinational, competition among host countries drives this
tax to zero.
2..5' Optimal tax policy in the home country
What can be said about optimal tax policy in the home country, once we take into account
the ability of multinationals to shift their profits abroad? The government's objective
function now becomes
W =V(w)+ )L{(1 —h)tw—e(a)
—rc(h)+
h[Tf(X) —TP*X +p(T —T*)P*X
—p(r—r')w(1 +b)X+ (r—pT)(p
—p)XFG]}.(9)
Here, e(a) measures the real costs of monitoring the use of transfer pricing at an intensity
level a.
We first consider the optimal revenue surtax, a. We showed above that with no cross-
border shifting a =0,and the optimal corporate tax was a non-distortionary cash flow
tax. That result no longer holds when firms can use transfer pricing to shift income across
borders.
In the appendix we show that OW/OX >0when tax rates are optimized. To use this
result, first differentiate W with respect to X to find that
Tff_rp*+p(T_T*)p*_p(r_r*)w(1+b)+(r_pfl(p*_p)Fg>O. (10)
We can rewrite equation (5), the first-order condition for X, as
(1—T)f'—(l _r)p+ (r_T*)(p* _p)_p(T_T*)p* +p(r—r)w —(r—pT)(p' —p)FO 0.
(11)
17Since we have shown that (1 —T)f'< (1 —r)p(i.e., X is greater with a subsidiary than
without), the sum of the last four terms of (11) must be positive when opening a subsidiary









—T)p+ p(r — — (r—pT)(p
—p)FO]> 0.
We showed in (11) that the sum of the terms in the brackets is positive. Therefore, o > 0
under the optimal policy, which means that a distortionary corporate tax is used. Taxing
entrepreneurs using r is now more costly because it induces transfer pricing. As a result,
entrepreneurs are taxed instead at least in part by a distorting tax, a, on gross revenue.
This tax also prevents an excessive shift into entrepreneurial activity and lessens the firm's
use of transfer pricing, but at the cost of distorting the firm's internal decisions.
We now characterize the relationship between the optimal i, r, and T. To do so, we
make use of another result proved in the appendix: that OW/oh <0 (holding w constant)
when policies are at their optimal values. Since, by utility maximization, Ow/Oh0,
this result implies that at the optimal policy tax revenue —the other component of social
welfare— falls at the margin as h increases. As a result, the labor income tax must exceed
the effective tax rate on time spent as an entrepreneur, another distortion not present
without transfer pricing. The opportunity for transfer pricing makes it more difficult to
tax entrepreneurial activity. Under optimal policy, there is a trade off between cutting
the distortion favoring entrepreneurial activity and increasing the distortion encouraging
transfer pricing.
To show this more formally, take the derivative of 14' with respect to h, holding w,
constant, to get
Tf —X[Tp —p(T
—T')p'+ p(r —r')w(l+ b) —(r—pT)(p*—p)FeJ
—tw—'rc'<0.
(13)
Multiplying (10), OW/OX, by X and subtracting from (13) yields
T(f —Xf')
—tw—rc'< 0. (14)
18Multiply the individual's first-order condition for h by r/(1 —r) andsubtract, to find that
T(f -f'X) - ____ - 11<0. (15)
Now multiply the firm's first-order condition for X by X and rearrange to find
1-r=(1-f'X). (16)
Substituting and rearranging terms yields
a(f-f'X)- <0. (17)
Since the concavity of f(X)ensuresthat the first term is positive, we learn that t > r
under the optimal policy.
Finally, we can also show that T < t under the optimal policy. To see this, first




—t).Similarly, combine the inequalities characterizing OW/Oh and OW/OX, to get
T(f —XI') — rc'<tw. If we multiply the first equation by t and the second equation by
1 —i,then subtract the first equation from the second, we find that
(t —T)(f—XI') >(t— r)c'. (18)
Since r <t, we therefore learn in addition that T < t. Since > 0, we find that t > T> r
under the optimal policies. In contrast, without transfer pricing, t =T=runder the
optimal policies.
2.4 Di3cussiorl
To some degree U.S. tax policy appears to have responded to these pressures. Except for
the period 1986—93, corporate tax rates have been below the top personal tax rate, the
rate probably most applicable when considering the behavior of potential entrepreneurs.
In addition, the U.S. has introduced some special provisions to lower the incentives to
make use of transfer pricing. For example, in 1986 the U.S. introduced new rules for al-
locating interest expenses among the various countries in which a multinational operates.
19Previously a firm could shift income by locating its interest expense where it was most
advantageous. The new rules require U.S. multinationals to allocate a fixed fraction of the
parent's interest expense to foreign source income,24 reducing the deductibility of the par-
ent's interest payments and thereby reducing the incentive for intracorporate borrowing.25
A similar allocation procedure is used for R&D expenses.
A change in enforcement policy now under discussion is to judge the plausibility of
a multinational's domestic profits as a whole, rather than the plausibility of each of the
prices used in calculating profits. This would be done presumably by comparing a ratio
of the firm's profits to sales or capital, to an equivalent ratio for purely domestic firms
operating in the same industry. In the limit, the firm would simply be assigned profits
for tax purposes equal to the profits to sales ratio observed for domestic firms times the
subsidiary's reported sales. As a result, the tax becomes a tax on sales rather than a tax on
income, with the rate varying by industry. Transfer pricing would no longer affect a firm's
tax liabilities, except to the degree to which it affected reported sales revenue, or reported
capital values. In the notation of our model, this policy has a positive a but a zero value
of r,apolicy not directly consistent with the results from the model but arguably not a
distant approximation.
Note that we have assumed in this model that only inputs are subject to transfer pricing,
so that a tax tied to sales revenue is not vulnerable to transfer pricing. It could equally
well be the case, however, that outputs are subject to transfer pricing, e.g. intermediate
goods could be sent abroad for assembly. Some of our specific results certainly change if
we allow for the export of outputs. But the main conclusion should be robust: countries
face pressure to keep corporate rates low to discourage transfer pricing, at the expense of
distorting individual career choices.26
24 Usually the allocation fraction isequal to the ratio of foreign to worldwide assets. This allocation rule
is itself vulnerable to shifting; for example, firms could reduce the allocation by leasing foreign assets and
buying assets used in domestic operations.
25 Gordon and MacKie-Mason(1991) examine the theoretical implications of the new U.S. interest allo-
Cation rule for borrowing location, while Froot and limes (this volume) and Collins and Shackelford (1992)
provide empirical evidence regarding its impact on firm behavior.
26 Thepolicy proposal to base taxes on sales is obviously very vulnerable to transfer pricing on exported
outputs.
20So far, we have taken the value of p as given. What happens as p is changed? If p
is raised, use of transfer pricing drops. For high enough values of p, multinationals will
choose not to set up subsidiaries abroad, eliminating any problems from transfer pricing.
The tax system would then revert to a wage tax supplemented by an equal rate cash-flow
corporate tax, given the assumptions of the model. Within the model, there is no efficiency
loss from taxing more heavily the pure profits earned by foreign subsidiaries, since transfer
pricing aside they earn no pure profits, so this would be the optimal policy.
One way to raise the value of p is to force more rapid repatriation of profits from abroad,
and in the limit by taxing foreign-source income at accrual. Such a policy may be costly
to enforce. Another way would be to decrease the tax on domestic-source capital income,
thereby reducing the gain from having funds accumulate abroad free of this domestic tax.
In the limit, if there were no domestic tax on capital income, then there would be no gain
from the deferral until repatriation of the tax due on foreign-source income.27 We can also
solve for the optimal values of a vs. F. Here, the result is immediate and clear. Holding
aF fixed, and thereby holding p fixed, the government would want to lower a in order to
save on resource costs, and increase fines to compensate. Fines can equally well discourage
transfer pricing, but involve a redistribution from the firm to the government rather than
a loss of real resources. This is simply a replication of the results in Becker (1968).
Imposing large fines on those caught using transfer pricing results in firms facing sizable
risks, however, since it is uncertain whether or not use of transfer prices will be detected
by the government. Polinsky and Shavell (1979) have argued against such aggressive use of
fines because of the risk-bearing costs this policy imposes. But idiosyncratic risk faced by
publicly traded firms should impose little or no risk-bearing costs on diversified sharehold-
ers. Large fines can well lead to heavy litigation costs, however, and these litigation costs
must be traded off with the real costs of greater enforcement efforts. Another problem with
high fines is that the government's assessment of the market price may be systematically
in error, so that the high potential fines force the firm to make use of distorted prices for
tax purposes, thereby distorting its real decisions. Since the government may be in a poor
27 This isequivalent to arguing that the current tax treatment of pensions would not affect the return
tolabor inasetting with a proportional wage taxandno capital income taxes.
21position to guess the appropriate market price for each of the thousands of specific items
transferred within a firm, large fines could well lead to substantial distortions to internal
allocation decisions within firms.
Rather than the government expending resources on enforcement, it could instead
require firms to expend resources, e.g. to document more carefully the criteria used in
setting their transfer prices, to aid the government in its enforcement efforts. Simply
shifting resource costs to the firm, however, does not eliminate the loss of real resources.28
Note in addition that this approach may be more effective at raising /3 than at raising a,
yet increases in j3 have ambiguous effects on the firm's net gain from using transfer pricing.
3. Other Tax Implications of Income Shifting
The above model helps explain the existence of at least cash-flow corporate taxes in smail
open economies, and justifies some deviations from a cash-flow tax in order to lessen the
amount of transfer pricing that occurs. The mere existence of corporate income taxes is not
the only puzzle raised in the recent theoretical analyses of optimal tax policy in an open
economy, however. Many detailed aspects of existing taxes have also seemed puzzling. In
particular, the past literature argues that residence-based taxes on the return to savings
can be appropriate for a small open economy, but that source-based taxes would not be.
Yet existing corporate taxes deviate in a variety of ways from a residence-based tax. To
begin with, existing taxes apply equally to all firms operating in a country, whereas a
residence-based tax would not tax the return earned by foreign-owned firms operating in
the country —doingso prevents the country from taking full advantage of the gains from
trade in the world capital market. Second, when domestic-owned subsidiaries operating
abroad face local taxes, a number of authors (e.g. Hamada (1966)) have argued that these
taxes should be treated as a deductible expense, rather than credited against domestic
taxes as under U.S. law. The idea is that a tax system should be designed so that the
return to the country on domestic vs. foreign investments is equated, and the return to the
28 It.is certainly possible that resources expended by firms gathering internal information may improve
enforcementmore than equivalent resources expended bythe government attempting to acquire the same
information from a distance.
22country on foreign investments would be measured net of any taxes paid abroad. Third,
under a pure residence-based tax domestic-owned subsidiaries operating abroad would be
taxed on their income at accrual (so that income from domestic and foreign sources is
taxed at the same rate), rather than at repatriation as under existing taxes.
Each of these aspects of existing corporate taxes seem puzzling, if the corporate tax
were in fact being designed to tax the return to savings by domestic residents. As argued
above, however, another important use of a corporate tax is as a backstop to the tax on
the labor income of domestic residents. If this is the sole role for the corporate tax, i.e.
if there is no attempt to tax the return to savings by domestic residents, then the above
features of the corporate tax can be rationalized easily.
Consider the first puzzle: why do countries impose a source-based tax on foreign firms at
the same rate as the residence-based tax on domestic firms? We will treat the case of a host
country. We showed above that host countries would have an incentive to impose at least
some taxes on foreign subsidiaries located in the country if domestic income shifting is a
problem. However, in that model domestic firms are not competitive with multinationals,
so all ownership is foreign and we cannot determine the optimal tax rules for domestic
firms. If we alter our assumptions to allow some domestic firms to survive in equilibrium
(perhaps in a different industry), what would be the appropriate policy? If these firms
were not multinationals, they would not be able to shift income across borders. Then
by our arguments in section 1, the optimal policy would be a cash-flow tax at rate t,
soas to avoid domestic income-shifting. This suggests that domestic-owned and foreign-
owned firms would face different tax rates, and only employees of foreign-owned firms
would engage in domestic income-shifting. But if tax rates differed by ownership, then a
new form of income shifting becomes possible: Domestic owners can give away their firms
to foreign owners, who receive nothing in return since the firms continue to break even.
However, the domestic employees of these firms gain because they can now shift part of
their labor income into corporate form, making it subject to the lower corporate tax rate
faced by foreign-owned firms. If this nominal transfer of ownership to foreigners is easy
enough, then no rate differential between domestic-owned and foreign-owned firms can
survive. A similar argument would also achieve this result for foreign and domestic firms
that both operate in a home country.
23Next consider the second puzzle: why do countries give credits for foreign taxes paid?
To begin with, we have already shown that a government would want to tax income earned
abroad, and that the tax on foreign-source income should be designed to limit the incentives
for cross-border income shifting. In the model above, this is most directly accomplished
by setting p1, so that foreign income is taxed at the same rate as domestic income.
In fact, international income shifting can take a variety of forms in addition to transfer
pricing, increasing the pressure to keep p high. For example, if the tax rate on foreign
earnings is less than the domestic tax rate on labor income, then domestic entrepreneurs
have the incentive to set up subsidiaries abroad that make use of their ideas, rather than at
home. (In this case, the subsidiary embodies the ideas of the home-country entrepreneur;
in the previous case, it embodied the ideas of the host-country entrepreneur.) Following
the logic of section 1, the optimal tax treatment would again involve taxing this foreign
source income at the same rate as domestic—source income.
Together these pressures would lead us to expect a subsidiary to be taxed at the maxi-
mum of the corporate tax rates prevailing in the host and the home country, to prevent tax
avoidance by either domestic or foreign residents. This is precisely what happens under
existing crediting schemes (assuming deferral has no effect on the net tax rate). Does
crediting introduce other distortions due to the differential tax treatment of foreign and
domestic firms operating in the same country? Suppose a domestic entrepreneur considers
selling his firm to foreigners. If he keeps the firm himself, he faces the domestic tax rate,
but if he sells it to foreigners the firm would face the maximum of the domestic and the
foreign rates, which would seem to discourage such a sale even though there might be good
economic grounds for it. The foreign firm can avoid this surtax, however, simply by mak-
ing royalty or wage payments to the original entrepreneur equal to the profits earned from
his ideas. The return to the entrepreneur's ideas would still be taxed at the labor income
tax rate. Net of these royalty/wage payments, the firm would break even, so that any
cash-flow surtax on the firm would collect no revenue and be nondistorting.29 Therefore,
29ifthe foreign corporate tax is distorting, then the sale can increase tax payments. However, if the
foreign tax applies uniformly to firms owned by foreign residents, regardless of where these firms are located,
then it simply reduces the return to labor in the foreign countries rather than affecting the attractiveness
of acquiring such a firm, leaving the above results unchanged.
24existing crediting schemes can readily be rationalized.30
The third puzzle we discuss is why countries tax foreign-source income upon repatri-
ation rather than when it accrues. In fact, the deferral of tax on foreign-source income
creates no problems as long as the after-local-tax rate of return earned abroad equals the
firm's discount rate.31 If the return earned abroad were lower, then the domestic owner
could simply repatriate earnings as they accrue. Deferral is only a problem if the rate
of return earned on funds kept abroad exceeds that available at home. If the domestic
government does not tax the return to savings, then capital mobility implies this cannot
occur. Deferral remains a puzzle, however, to the extent to which there is a domestic tax
on the return to savings, unless the costs of enforcing a tax at accrual are too high.
While we have provided a rationale for a variety of aspects of existing corporate income
taxes, some other puzzles remain. For one, we have not addressed the question raised in
the prior literature concerning why existing corporate taxes include the return to capital
in the tax base.32 In addition, while we have argued that countries have an incentive
to tax foreign source income at the same effective rate as domestic-source income, some
countries (e.g. France and the Netherlands) exempt foreign-source income from tax. This
also seems puzzling, unless their domestic tax rates are low enough that residents would
not gain by shifting income abroad. An intermediate position is taken by Norway, which
exempts foreign-source income earned in countries with tax rates at least two-thirds as
high as Norway's rate, while taxing income from low-tax countries.
Several further complications could be added to the model, changing the results. For
example, given the set-up of the model, the optimal tax scheme ignoring transfer pricing
would impose equal tax rates on employees and entrepreneurs, in order to avoid distorting
career choices. But a major activity of entrepreneurs is to develop new ideas for profitable
30 This theory rationalizes theuse of credits, but does not preclude the use of deductions. If taxes paid
abroad were allowed as a deduction rather than credited against domestic tax liabilities, as recommended
in Hamada (1966), the tax rate on foreign-source income would be yet higher. It would certainly be high
enough to prevent income shifting yet without income shifting it would still apply to a zero tax base so
impose no distortions.
31 See footnote13, above.
32 While, the above model could rationalizelimiting the deductions for capital purchases if physical
capital inputs were particularly subject to transfer pricing, this explanation does not seem very plausible.
25business activities. The return earned by entrepreneurs on these new ideas can differ
from the social return to the ideas for a variety of reasons, justifying a differential tax
treatment to correct for these distorted incentives. For example, others can learn an
entrepreneur's ideas from observation and set up competing firms using the same ideas,
diluting the profits of the original entrepreneur.33 In addition, the original entrepreneur
can use his new information to profit from trading on the securities market. As argued by
Hirshleifer (1971), the resulting profits from trade can well exceed the social return to the
idea. If returns to the entrepreneur's ideas result from acquired monopoly rents, e.g., from
successful rent-seeking behavior, then the social return to the effort will again be less than
the private return. Therefore, a variety of questions can be raised about the appropriate
relative tax rates on employees vs. entrepreneurs.
One response to transfer pricing by U.S. states is to shift from separate accounting to
formula apportionment. Under separate accounting, transfer prices are needed for all goods
and services traded across state lines, raising severe enforcement problems. In contrast,
under formula apportionment, national rather than state profits are calculated. These
national profits are then apportioned among the various states based on the fraction of the
firm's capital, payroll, and sales located in each state. This approach effectively eliminates
pressures from transfer pricing among domestic operations of firms, at least as long as the
factors in the formula are not themselves subject to transfer pricing. Would this approach
also make sense for taxation at a world level? Not if income shifting is the primary
consideration justifying the presence of a corporate income tax. To prevent income shifting,
a country would want an entrepreneur to face the same tax rate on his corporate income
as he would have faced instead on his personal income. But under formula apportionment,
the effective tax rate faced by an entrepreneur would be a weighted average of the tax rates
prevailing in all the jurisdictions in which he does business. The entrepreneur therefore
has the incentive to invest in low tax jurisdictions, thereby raising the return to being an
entrepreneur.
Patents provide some limited protection for certain types of ideas,but manyprofitable ideas are not
patentable.
264. Conclusions
Several recent papers, such as Gordon (1986) and Razin and Sadka (1991), show that
standard theoretical models forecast that a small open economy will not impose source-
based taxes on capital income. Unless residence-based capital-income taxes can in practice
include foreign-source as well as domestic-source income, which in practice is unlikely given
the difficulties a government faces in monitoring foreign-source income, then as argued
by Razin and Sadka (1991) residence-based taxes would not be feasible. Optimal taxes
simply consist of taxes on immobile domestic factors, presumably labor and land. But
this theoretical forecast stands in stark contrast to the observed tax law in essentially all
developed countries, where corporate taxes not only exist but where corporate rates are
roughly comparable to the top personal tax rates.
In this paper, we argue that many aspects of the existing corporate tax law would
seem quite sensible if the primary role of the corporate tax is to discourage income shift-
ing between the personal and the corporate tax bases, or between domestic and foreign
subsidiaries. Unless corporate tax rates are roughly comparable to personal tax rates,
business owners would be able to avoid taxes by retaining earnings within their firm, and
later selling shares in the firm, so that the earnings are taxed at capital gains rates rather
than at personal rates. Unless foreign-owned firms operating in the country are subject to
domestic taxes at the same rate, then a domestic business owner would be able to avoid
taxes on the returns to his ideas by selling his firm to foreign-owners. Similarly, a country
would need to tax the income of domestic-owned subsidiaries operating abroad, to prevent
entrepreneurs from facing a tax incentive to make use of their ideas abroad rather than in
the home country.
If the tax rate on domestic-owned subsidiaries abroad were less than the domestic
corporate tax rate, then an additional distortion would be created because multinationals
can avoid domestic taxes by shifting their profits abroad through transfer prices even if
the firms embodying their profitable ideas remain at home. While taxing foreign-source
income at the same rate as domestic-source income eliminates this pressure, a second-
best response is to lower the domestic tax on elements of the income statement that are
27most subject to transfer pricing. For example, the U.S. has reduced the effective tax rate
applying to interest deductions of multinationals through its section 482 rules.
Viewing the corporate tax as primarily a backstop to the personal tax on labor income,
rather than as primarily a tax on capital income, requires an important change in focus
from that of the recent academic literature. Given the ease with which existing tax policy
can be rationalized based on this role for the corporate tax, such a change in focus appears
warranted. How great are the pressures from income shifting between the personal and
the corporate tax bases? We have presented some evidence in Gordon and MacKie-Mason
(1994) and MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1992) on the degree to which firms change between
corporate and noncorporate status in response to tax incentives. There has been virtually
no attempt to date in the tax literature, however, to measure the degree to which individ-
uals shift their form of pay in response to tax differences. Since our model suggests that
this form of income—shifting appears to be a major consideration in the design of existing
tax structures, measuring the degree to which such income shifting occurs in response to
tax differences is an important topic for future research.
28APPENDIX
Proof that OW/Oh <0 when w, is held constant.
In the model with both domestic and cross-border income-shifting, consider the effects
in the home country of raising r and in addition raising T by enough to keep firms' choice
for X unchanged, given p. Assume in addition that t is simultaneously cut by enough so
as to keep w, unchanged.34 Under the optimal tax policy, the resulting marginal change
in welfare should be zero. The resulting change in welfare equals
OW fOps Op OT\ OW / Oh Oh OT Oh Ot\
(A.1)
It is straight-forward to demonstrate that the combined increases in r and T cause p to
rise, and that this rise in p5 lowers welfare. Therefore, the second term in equation (A. 1)
must be positive. But the increase in business taxes and the drop in labor taxes will cause
h to fall, implying that OW/Oh must be negative, when evaluated at the optimal policies.
Proof that OW/OX > 0 when w, is held constant
In the model with both domestic and cross-border income shifting, consider the effects
of raising o, while cutting t so as to leave w, unchanged. The first-order condition is
OW IOhOh Ot \OWOp5 OW OX
(A.2)
This tax policy raises corporate taxes and cuts personal taxes. As a result, h will fall,
implying that the first term in equation (A.2) is positive. In addition, raising the surtax
on repatriated profits by raising o makes transfer pricing relatively less attractive. Thus
decreases, implying that the second term is also positive. Therefore, the third term
must be negative. But the increase in the surtax on revenues leads to a reduction in X,
implying that OW/OX > 0 under the optimal policies.
That the required change inis negative is straight-forward but tedious to demonstrate.
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